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One of the most notable phenomena during economic transition is the shrinkage of the 
public sector and expansion of the not working population, simultaneously with the 
expansion of both the formal and informal private sectors. We address the related labour 
dynamics of the pre and post 1996 crisis in Bulgaria with the use of a panel constructed 
from the 1995 and 1997 Bulgarian Integrated Household Surveys and a Markov chain 
model of job mobility. Our results support the hypothesis of substantial shrinkage of the 
public sector and movement out of the labour force. In addition, we find that during the 
rapid downsizing of the public sector, the informal sector expanded more rapidly than 
the formal private sector. The links between the formal and informal sectors are 
complex and differ by gender. 
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1 Introduction 
One of the phenomena most noted during economic transition is the shrinkage of the 
public sector and the expansion of the not working population, simultaneously with the 
expansion of both the formal and informal private sectors. The formal private sector is 
usually portrayed as the more ‘productive’ sector and often policy is oriented to 
expanding the size of that sector. On the other hand, we do find stylized stories of the 
transition and development process giving an important role to the informal private 
sector. This sector is beyond the reach of protective factory and labour legislation and is 
usually characterized by relatively free entry by labour, competition, low wages and low 
overhead. These characteristics are viewed as a potential source of great expansion. 
In this article we examine the labour market links of the informal private sector to other 
parts of an East European economy in transition. We examine the ‘before and after’ of 
the Bulgarian 1996-97 crisis and market-oriented policy reforms. We adopt a broad 
definition of informal sector work that goes beyond non-contractual work for an 
employer and encompasses any entrepreneurial effort in enhancing one’s standard of 
living beyond the boundaries of reported income. Conventional thinking about job 
mobility during crises in economic transition places its emphasis on the shutting down 
of the public sector and the expansion of the formal private sector, as well as on large-
scale movement into not working. Indeed, the conventional transition literature has 
proliferated, almost without exception, along two lines of analysis.  
Firm level studies have scrutinized the job creation and job destruction aspects of post-
communist structural adjustment. They established that while both public and privatized 
(or de novo) firms destroyed a significant number of jobs, the private firms were better 
at simultaneously creating new job opportunities than their state-owned counterparts 
(Bilsen and Konings 1998; Faggio and Konings 2003; Acquisti and Lehmann 2000). 
However, these studies, based on balance sheet and aggregate employment information 
from manufacturing sector firms, were not able to shed light on human capital 
reallocation within these economies.  
Household level research established that while the labour flow out of employment into 
not working was significant, the simultaneous non-employment to employment flow 
was far from being negligible (Bellmann et al. 1995; Sorm and Terrell 2000; Hunt 
2002). The risk of permanent job loss was lowest among highly skilled and young 
individuals; and it was most significant among women with low education levels (Jones 
and Kato 1997; Hunt 2002; Ham et al. 1998; Sorm and Terrell 2000). The focus of this 
literature was the exploration of the determinants of unemployment and labour mobility 
between working and not working. The literature did not address the fate of people 
falling between these observable labour market categories.  
We use a Markov chain to model labour mobility among both public and private 
employment, the informal sector and not working. In this way we attempt to explore the 
subtleties in choices facing a potential employee, including the possibility of a 
preference for public sector employment and the distinction between public, and formal 
and informal private sector absorption of labour from the pool of not working people. 
Next, we use a multinomial logit to study the effect of human characteristics on labour 
mobility.    2
We use a panel constructed by merging the 1995 and 1997 Bulgarian Integrated 
Household Surveys (BIHS). The Bulgarian experience during this period was unique 
due to the drastic financial crisis, the ensuing rapid structural reform and massive public 
sector labour shedding. The main advantage of the panel is that it allows us to track the 
labour market history of people before and after the crisis of 1996 and hence analyze its 
effect on human capital reallocation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some relevant 
characteristics of the economic transition and the 1996 financial crisis in Bulgaria with 
its special impact on the labour market. Section 3 describes the data. The results from 
our transition matrix analysis are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses our 
regression estimates, while Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
2  Economic transition, crisis, labour market and poverty in Bulgaria 
During the first half of the 1990s Bulgaria experienced significant output loss and rising 
inflation, much more than in most other Central and East European (CEE) countries. 
Whereas the CEE economies that joined the European Union (EU) in 2004 reached the 
trough of their output loss in 1991-92 and were able to contain inflation by 1993, 
Bulgaria’s GDP continued to fall through 1993, while hyperinflation was witnessed as 
late as 1997. This lackluster performance relative to most other CEE countries was 
largely a result of the absence of reform until the financial crisis of 1996-97. 
Reforms were initiated in earnest only after the financial crisis, and they included rapid 
privatization, reform of the pension and social-welfare structure, and the establishment 
of a currency board. One of the immediate outcomes of this programme was the transfer 
of most of Bulgaria’s productive resources from public into private hands, such that by 
the end of the 1990s, the private sector accounted for nearly 70 per cent of the country’s 
GDP (National Statistical Institute 2003; Bulgarian Privatization Agency 2000). In the 
process, official employment declined at the rate of about 2 per cent per annum and as 
late as 2001 the unemployment rate was as high as 17.3 per cent, with 62 per cent of the 
unemployed people remaining unemployed for more than a year. At the same time the 
unemployment benefit system in Bulgaria remained among of the least generous in 
Europe (Garibaldi, Makovec and Stoyanova 2001).  
The crisis of 1996-97 contributed to not only rapid restructuring and labour shedding, 
but also to a significant real wage decline, such that by 1997 the average real wage in 
Bulgaria was 61.1 per cent lower than its 1990 level (Rutkowski 2003). Besides 
earnings, hyperinflation also eroded savings; indeed much more than in other transition 
economies in CEE (Rutkowski 1999; IMF 2002). All of these contributed to a 77 per 
cent increase in poverty in the 1995-97 period (Sahn et al. 2002).  
It is interesting to note that despite the low level of unemployment benefits, one of the 
highest unemployment rates in CEE, and high correlation between unemployment and 
poverty, reservation wages in Bulgaria remained high throughout the transition period 
(Rutkowski 1999). This observation, together with the extraordinarily high 
discouragement rate among unemployed males indicates that a high proportion of the 
Bulgarian population might have found its way towards the informal economy 
(Garibaldi et al. 2001). The plausibility of this proposition is further augmented by the 
extraordinary payroll tax burden in transition Bulgaria, accumulating into a 41 per cent   3
tax wedge between labour costs to employer and take home earnings, as well as by an 
excessively restrictive business environment leading to a lower number of officially 
registered Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) than elsewhere in CEE. According to 
existing macroeconomic estimates, the informal economy in Bulgaria accounts for at 
least a fourth of the country’s GDP (Nenovski and Hristov 2000).  
3 Data 
Gallup International conducted the Bulgarian Integrated Household Surveys (BIHS) 
under the auspices of the Bulgarian Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and the National Institute of Statistics. These surveys provide detailed information about 
employment, income, education, and demographic characteristics for all members of 
about 2,500 households in 1995, 1997 and 2001.1 We create a panel from the 1995 and 
1997 BIHS, spanning the crisis and watershed period during which large scale industrial 
restructuring and privatization occurred. Sample attrition prevented creating a panel 
data set across all three years; the 2001 sample is a result of a random selection process 
and is unrelated to that of the earlier two. After accounting for discrepancies in the data, 
we are left with a total of 2,873 individuals of whom we use the subsample of 1,639 
individuals (from 781 households) who are 15-65 years of age and, if working, report 
positive income.2  
Our empirical methodology involves the use of a Markov chain in the first step and a 
multinomial logit in the second step of our analysis. We allocate individuals to one of 
four labour market sectors based on the sector in which they are employed in their main 
job (public sector, formal private sector, informal private sector, and not working).3 We 
categorize both government employees and employees of state-owned enterprises as 
belonging to the public sector.4  
Key to our analysis is how we assign individuals to the informal sector. Our strategy 
establishing who participates in the informal sector is two-fold. First, we look at the 
self-employed and their specific jobs. Those who are in jobs that are likely to be in the 
informal sector, such as taxi drivers, hairdressers and salespeople, we assign to the 
informal sector. Otherwise, they are placed in the formal private sector. Second, we 
carefully examine those people claiming to be not working, and determine whether they 
are truly not working or whether they are in the informal sector. We implement this by 
first establishing the expenditure to income ratio of households for which we feel 
comfortable in asserting that no one is in the informal sector. We consider two worker 
                                                 
1  The surveys included information about 2,466 households with a total of 7,199 members in 1995, 
2,323 households with 6,947 members in 1997 and 2,633 households with 7,844 members in 2001.  
2  In restricting the sample to age group 15-65 we use the ILO standards which were applied by the 
National Statistics Institute in Bulgaria in its labour force surveys and by World Bank reports based on 
these surveys. We use the sample including 1,639 individuals for our descriptive statistics and transition 
analysis. However, missing observations, primarily with respect to years of education reduce this sample 
further and we use 1,470 observations in our regression analysis. 
3  An average of 30 individuals reported having a second job for each of the survey years, so the 
categorization of laborers in accordance with their main job should not affect our analysis. 
4  Since in our sample only 60 individuals in 1995 and 59 individuals in 1997 worked for the 
government, it is impractical to analyze them as a separate category.   4
households in 1995 where both spouses state they do not have a second job, and find 
that their median expenditures exceeded median income by 18 per cent. With this 
information we then assign to the informal sector anyone who is not working and is in a 
household in which household expenditures exceed household income by 100 per cent. 
Our rationale is quite obvious; to fund this lifestyle income must be coming from 
somewhere. Borrowing was fairly primitive in Bulgaria at this time, and our income 
measure already includes transfers and incomes from real estate and financial assets. 
In Table 1 we report the means and standard deviations of age, years of education, 
marital status, whether there are children less than 6 years of age in the household, 
location, ethnicity, gender and total family income for all individuals in our sample. We 
separate individuals by their labour market status in both 1995 and 1997. For example, 
the average age of individuals who worked in the public sector in 1995 and in 1997 is 
41.27 years of age while the average age of people who moved from the public sector in 
1995 to the private sector in 1997 is 40.59 years.  
These descriptive statistics highlight some interesting patterns. The average number of 
years of education did not vary significantly for labourers who were employed in either 
the public or private sectors in both 1995 and 1997. However, the educational 
attainment of people who were employed in either of these sectors for both years was 
noticeably higher than that of people who were in the informal sector or not working 
during at least one of the surveys. This observation is consistent with both the existing 
literature that finds a significant skill-based gap between employed and unemployed 
people across the CEE economies, and the presumption that the informal sector in 
Bulgaria might have developed along the low-skilled outskirts of the economy. 
Next, the average number of years of education of people in the informal sector who 
found employment in the public sector exceeded that of informal sector people who 
found employment in the private sector. At the same time the difference between years 
of education of non-working people who found employment in either the public or the 
private sector is not statistically significant. Taken together, our observations on the 
skill-based labour reallocation of individuals across sectors does not suggest that the 
formal private sector in Bulgaria developed as a sector employing low skill labourers 
who lost their jobs in the public sector. Arguments to the contrary (see e.g., Falaris 
(2004)) arise when the informal sector is not treated as a separate labour market state 
distinct from either formal employment or not working. 
Third, the average age of individuals who left either public or private sector 
employment for the informal sector exceeds the average age of individuals who 
remained in either the public or private formal sector. At the same time, the average age 
of people who entered the private sector is significantly lower than the age of 
individuals who faced alternative labour market states. These observations are 
consistent with the presumption that employers in the formal private sector are more 
willing to hire labourers whose work habits are not influenced by the socialist era work 
culture. They also indicate that the informal sector in Bulgaria might have developed as 
a cushion for older labourers who lost their employment in the formal economy.    5
Table 1a 
Individuals who were in the public sector in 1995; their situation in 1997 








Age (years)  41.27  40.59  42.50  40.15 
  (8.73) (10.37) (11.05)  (12.16) 
Education (years)  11.68 11.70  10.71  9.92 
 (3.02)  (2.73)  (2.70)  (3.25) 
Female 0.53  0.35  0.52  0.41 
 (0.50)  (0.48)  (0.50)  (0.50) 
Married 0.88  0.83  0.87  0.63 
 (0.32)  (0.38)  (0.34)  (0.49) 
Children under 6 years  0.26  0.41  0.33  0.11 
 (0.53)  (0.60)  (0.59)  (0.32) 
Ethnic minority  0.08  0.06  0.11  0.19 
 (0.28)  (0.23)  (0.32)  (0.40) 
Urban 0.83  0.80  0.78  0.44 
 (0.38)  (0.41)  (0.42)  (0.51) 
Household income (monthly) 14357.83  15486.09  19433.82  13979.08 
 (7718.15) (8504.85) (45342.11)  (5909.98) 
No. of observations  464.00  54.00  141.00  27.00 
 
Table 1b 
Individuals who were in the private sector in 1995; their situation in 1997 








Age (years)  38.80  32.71  39.30  42.67 
  (9.48) (9.40) (11.79)  (10.50) 
Education (years)  11.52 11.57  10.78  7.50 
 (3.48)  (2.83)  (2.47)  (2.81) 
Female 0.36  0.38  0.44  0.50 
 (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.50)  (0.55) 
Married 0.88  0.67  0.75  1.00 
 (0.33)  (0.48)  (0.44)  0.00 
Children under 6 years  0.28  0.63  0.42  0.33 
 (0.61)  (0.87)  (0.55)  (0.82) 
Ethnic minority  0.08  0.21  0.17  0.50 
 (0.28)  (0.41)  (0.38)  (0.55) 
Urban 0.68  0.79  0.73  0.17 
 (0.48)  (0.41)  (0.45)  (0.41) 
Household income (monthly) 14016.89  14278.19  17915.15  13173.45 
 (6446.50) (0.8870.463) (12979.14)  (8204.61) 
No. of observations  25.00  48.00  64.00  6.00   6
Table 1c 
Individuals who were in the informal sector in 1995; their situation in 1997 








Age  (years)  49.31 30.89 41.81  40.78 
 (8.38)  (11.57)  (15.92)  (14.66) 
Education (years)  11.96 11.07 10.08  8.00 
  (3.51) (2.34) (3.58)  (2.56) 
Female  0.48 0.61 0.43  0.44 
  (0.51) (0.50) (0.50)  (0.51) 
Married  0.83 0.67 0.65  0.83 
  (0.38) (0.49) (0.48)  (0.38) 
Children under 6 years  0.31  0.22  0.34  0.06 
  (0.67) (0.55) (0.62)  (0.24) 
Ethnic  minority  0.07 0.22 0.22  0.50 
  (0.26) (0.55) (0.62)  (0.51) 
Urban  0.90 0.78 0.76  0.22 
  (0.31) (0.43) (0.43)  (0.42) 
Household  income  (monthly)  6456.00 7702.17 7138.11  8336.89 
 (6738.61) (8436.35) (7085.03) (11252.03) 
No. of observations  29.00  18.00  140.00  18.00 
 
Table 1d 
Individuals who were in the ‘not working’ sector in 1995; their situation in 1997 








Age (years)  34.83  32.14  41.20  41.40 
 (12.87)  (12.26)  (18.10)  (18.07) 
Education (years)  10.71 10.77  9.15  7.93 
 (3.92)  (3.02)  (3.33)  (3.09) 
Female 0.50  0.49  0.59  0.56 
 (0.51)  (0.51)  (0.49)  (0.50) 
Married 0.64  0.62  0.60  0.66 
 (0.48)  (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.48) 
Children under 6 years  0.38  0.43  0.21  0.22 
 (0.62)  (0.69)  (0.52)  (0.52) 
Ethnic minority  0.19  0.43  0.20  0.35 
 (0.38)  (0.50)  (0.40)  (0.48) 
Urban 0.57  0.65  0.62  0.28 
 (0.50)  (0.48)  (0.49)  (0.45) 
Household income (monthly)  12161.15  14566.51  12586.00  14287.89 
 (8978.13) (13168.72) (10537.23) (9271.21) 
No. of observations  42.00  37.00  422.00  104.00   7
Another observation we can make from Table 1 is that in all cases the proportion of 
people working who come from an urban area is between 60 per cent and 80 per cent 
while the proportion of people not working who come from an urban area is 17 per cent 
to 44 per cent. This suggests that jobs, both formal and informal, are hard to come by in 
rural areas. 
Finally, there appears to be easily distinguishable gender differences in the patterns of 
formal employment, not working and informal sector employment. The proportion of 
women who retained public sector employment or moved from not working or private 
sector employment into the public sector exceeds the proportion of women who retained 
private employment or exited the public sector or not working to embrace private 
employment. However, the proportion of women who left the informal sector for private 
employment significantly exceeded that of women who transited from the informal 
sector into public sector employment, and the proportion of women who exited from not 
working to enter the informal sector exceeded the proportion of women who remained 
in the pool of non-working people. The above patterns are difficult to interpret. While 
there is an apparent preference among women who work in the formal sector to retain 
public sector employment, perhaps due to child related or other benefits, the preference 
for private over public employment after exiting the informal sector might be an 
indication of either bad signals sent to potential public sector employers, or self-
selection of more entrepreneurial women into the ranks of either the formal or the 
informal private sector. These hypotheses will be explored further in our formal analysis 
in Sections 4 and 5.  
Overall, the data do not indicate that the formal private sector in the Bulgarian economy 
has developed along the low skill outskirts of the economy. Specifically, we find a clear 
pattern whereby both younger (and perhaps more entrepreneurial) and higher skill 
individuals tend to reallocate towards the formal private sector. In addition, we find a 
weak indication that the informal sector might have developed as a cushion to both 
older and lower skills individuals against the adversities of the crisis period. 
4  A Markov chain model of Bulgarian transition 
The aim of this section is to characterize the transition in Bulgaria from 1995 to 1997 
with particular attention paid to movements into and out of the informal sector. We have 
data on two periods, 1995 and 1997, and a natural way to think about how the cross-
sectional distribution evolves over this time period is via the first order Markov chain 
(FOMC) model.5 This approach to modeling the dynamics of the cross-sectional 
distribution of individuals has a long history in economics. Early work by 
Champernowne (1953) and Prais (1955) looked at the cross-sectional dynamics of 
individual incomes and social status, respectively.  
We are interested in the labour market outcomes of individuals in Bulgaria where we 
categorize an individual into one of four labour market categories: public, private, 
informal, and not working. The first three categories are working categories while the 
last category is the out-of-labour force category. Individuals in this category include 
                                                 
5  As a practical matter, as we only have data on two years, we are restricted to looking at only the 
first order Markov model.   8
those who have retired, those who are studying and those who have left the labour force 
and have stopped searching for a new job.6 We characterize the evolution of the cross-
section distribution of individuals via the FOMC model introduced in Champernowne 
(1953).  
The FOMC model is defined as follows. In each period we allocate each individual into 
one of the four categories defined above. Let  } 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 { ∈ it s  represent the category that 
individual i is a member of in period t. Here an individual is in category 1 if they work 
in the public sector, category 2 if they work in the private sector, category 3 if they are 
assigned to the informal sector, and category 4 if they report themselves to be out of the 
labour force. Let 
(1)   ] [ j x P jt = = π   
be the probability that an individual is in category j in period t. Then  
(2)   )' , , , ( 4 3 2 1 t t t t t π π π π π =  
represents the cross-sectional probability distribution of individuals in period t. The 
FOMC model aims to describe the dynamics of this probability distribution over time. 
In particular, the FOMC model states that the conditional distribution 
   ] , | [ 1 k t t t P − − π π π K  
is a function of  1 − t π  for all k=1,2,… . That is, 
(3)   P t t ' ' 1 − =π π , 
where P is the probability transition matrix.  
The probability transition matrix  ] [ ij p P =  is a matrix whose individual elements, ij p , 
represents the probability that an individual moves from category i in period  1 − t  to 
category j in period t. As the categories that an individual can move to encompasses all 
possibilities, it follows that the sum of each row of P must be 1.  
The FOMC model described in (3) has a unique limiting (ergodic) distribution if there is 
only one eigenvalue of P that has modulus equal to 1.7 Given some initial state,  0 π  , it 
follows from (1) that 
(4)   , ' ' 0
t
t P π π =  
so that the limiting (or ergodic) distribution implied by the FOMC is 
                                                 
6  We include retirees and students, as there is a choice element in their decisions to be students or 
retirees. Indeed, many came out of retirement between 1995 and 1997 and back into the labour force. 
7 Note  that  P is a row stochastic matrix, which implies that the rows of P sum to 1. In this case the 
maximum eigenvalue of P has modulus equal to 1. If there are no repeated eigenvalues with modulus 
equal to 1 then the limiting distribution is unique.    9
(5)  
t
t P Lim 0 ' ' π π ∞ → = . 
We are interested in a number of parameters. These include the initial state  95 π , the 
final state,  97 π , the probability transition matrix P and the limiting state, π , of the 
Markov chain. The first three parameters can easily be estimated using likelihood 
methods. However, the limiting state is a highly complicated non-linear function of P. It 
is the left eigenvector of P associated with the eigenvalue 1. In this case, the maximum 
likelihood estimates of the limiting state are difficult to obtain and require asymptotic 
approximations. On the other hand, Bayesian methods allow for exact finite 
distributions of all parameters. We therefore use Bayesian methods to estimate our 
parameters with the priors chosen to be as diffuse as possible within a specific 
distributional family. 
A very good discussion on Bayesian methods to estimate the FOMC model can be 
found in Geweke et al. (1986) and more recently in Geweke (2003). To summarize, let 
{}
T M
t i it MT s S 1 1 = = = be the observed categories for each individual for each time period in 
our sample. Define the indicator variable  ijk δ  to be 1 if individual i, is in category k, in 
period  j and 0 otherwise. That is,  1 = ijk δ  only if  k sij = . Then the information 
contained in  MT S  can be summarized by the following two summary statistics:  1 n , the 
number of individuals each category initially, and N , the data transition matrix. Here, 





k i k n
1
1 1 δ  
is the number of individuals in category k in period 1. The data transition matrix, 
] [ kl n N =  where 







itl k it kl n
12
1 δ δ  
is the number of observed transitions from category k to category l across all individuals 
and all time periods.8  
Given these sufficient statistics, the likelihood function for the FOMC model is 

















kl k p P S p π π . 
The maximum likelihood estimators for  1 π and P are, therefore, 
                                                 
8  It is implicitly assumed that there is no structural break in the transition probability matrix, P, in 
this formulation.   10






























It is clear that the estimators for each row of P are independent of the other rows of P 
and independent of the estimator for the initial distribution. This independence of the 
rows of P allows us to define a simple conjugate prior for  1 π  and P. Each row of P and 
1 π  has the same property, that is, each element is a probability and the sum of all 
elements is 1. This suggests that the appropriate form of conjugate prior for  1 π  and for 
each row of P is Dirichlet (multivariate Beta).9 A random vector,  ) , , ( 1 m π π π K = , is 
distributed with a Dirichlet distribution parameterized by vector a if 







. 1   and 1 0 π π  
The probability density function for the Dirichlet distribution is 
   ()
1 1
1 ... 1 − − ∝ m a
m
a p π π π , 




























Therefore, the prior for P will be made up of independent Dirichlet distributions, one for 
each row, and the prior for  1 π  will also be independent Dirichlet. Thus, 











j a p π π , 
and 











ij p A P p , 
                                                 
9  See Bernado and Smith (1994: 134-135) for a complete description of the Dirichlet disitrbution.   11
where the priors are parameterized by  1 a  and  ] [ ij a A =  respectively. 
The prior densities given in (8) together with the likelihood function given in (6) yields 
a posterior density of 
(9)   ∏∏ ∏
== =















jk jk i i p S P p π π , 
so that it is clear that the posterior distribution is a product of independent Dirichlet 
distributions parameterized by vectors of the form  ij ij n a + in the case of the rows of P 
and  i i n a 1 1 + in the case of the initial distribution,  1 π  . The posterior distribution given in 
(9) is a known distribution and it is simple to make independent and identically 
distributed pseudo-random draws from this distribution. The results presented below are 
calculated using these i.i.d. draws from (9). 
4.1  Summary of transition results 
The following results are for the FOMC model described above. Table 2a reports the 
posterior means and standard deviations for the full sample (males and females) while 
Tables 2b and 2c report the posterior means and standard deviations for a FOMC using 
only males and females, respectively. In all cases the prior distribution for the initial 
distribution ( 95 π ) and each row of P is used. 
(10)   () )) 1 . 0 , 1 . 0 , 1 . 0 , 1 . 0 (( ~ Dirichlet p π . 
With  ) 1 . 0 , 1 . 0 , 1 . 0 , 1 . 0 ( = a we have a prior mean of 0.25 for each parameter of the 
distribution  95 π  or row of P, and a prior standard deviation of 0.366. Thus the prior 
used, while proper, is chosen to be very diffuse. In this way the results presented below 
reflect information coming from the observed sample and not from our prior. It is clear 
that the posterior standard deviations are significantly smaller than the prior standard 
deviations, which implies that the prior is having minimal impact on the results. 
The Markov chain model’s parameters are the initial distribution and the probability 
transition matrix. We are also interested in the final distribution and the limiting 
distribution, which is what the cross-sectional distribution of job categories would look 
like if the transitions continued on forever without change. Bayesian methods allow us 
to construct finite sample distributions for all parameters of the model and, most 
importantly, any well-defined function of these parameters including the limiting 
distribution of the Markov chain. Given the prior, the results presented are very similar 
to estimates we would have obtained had we used maximum likelihood as our 
estimation method.  
These results show the effect of the economic crisis that hit Bulgaria in 1996. Before the 
crisis, the informal sector was relatively small and accounted for about 12.5 per cent of 
the population. After the crisis, the informal sector grew to about 47 per cent of the 
population. If this process continued without change the informal sector would grow to 
about 51 per cent, as we can see from the limiting distribution. This change appears to 
be facilitated by a reduction in the size of the public sector and movement out of not   12
working into the informal sector. The private sector has grown slightly after the crisis 
but it appears that most people could not find jobs in the formal private sector and so 
were forced to work in the informal private sector. The fact that the proportion of people 
not working shrank suggests that households had lost income during the crisis and 
individuals belonging to these households were forced to exit not working in order to 
survive. 
Tables 2b and 2c report the results for males and females, respectively. While the 
pattern of movement is similar for males and females, there are some differences. In 
1995, males were slightly more likely to work in the public sector than females, with 
42.6 per cent of all males working in the public sector compared to 41.2 per cent of all 
females. After the crisis the percentage of males and females in the public sector are 
about the same at 34.1 per cent and 34.2 per cent, respectively. Thus the proportion of 
males working in the public sector fell by more than the proportion of females working 
in the public sector. Evidence for this is the estimate of the probability of staying in the 
public  sector. Females have approximately 0.05 more probability of staying in the 
public sector compared to males (0.704 compared to 0.648).  
 
Table 2a 
Estimation results for Markov chain: full sample 
 
 Public  Private  Informal  Not  working 
Initial distribution: 1995     
 0.419  0.087  0.125  0.369 
 (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.012) 
Final distribution: 1997     
 0.342  0.096  0.468  0.095 
 (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.007) 
Limiting distribution       
 0.299  0.111  0.516  0.075 
 (0.031)  (0.015)  (0.030)  (0.012) 
Probability transition matrix     
 Public  Private  Informal  Not  working 
Public 0.676  0.079  0.206  0.040 
 (0.018)  (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.008) 
Private 0.174  0.335  0.448 0.043 
 (0.032)  (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.017) 
Informal 0.141  0.088  0.683  0.088 
 (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.033)  (0.020) 
Not working  0.070  0.061  0.697  0.172 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.019)  (0.015)   13
Table 2b 
Estimation results for Markov chain: males 
 
 Public  Private  Informal  Not  working 
Initial distribution: 1995     
 0.426  0.107  0.141  0.326 
 (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.017) 
Final distribution: 1997     
 0.341  0.115  0.450  0.094 
 (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.010) 
Limiting distribution       
 0.278  0.106  0.537  0.079 
 (0.040)  (0.020)  (0.042)  (0.017) 
Probability transition matrix     
 Public  Private  Informal  Not  working 
Public 0.648  0.104  0.201  0.048 
 (0.026)  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.012) 
Private 0.190  0.354  0.420  0.036 
 (0.042)  (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.020) 
Informal 0.134  0.063  0.713  0.090 
 (0.032)  (0.023)  (0.043)  (0.027) 
Not working  0.081  0.074  0.668  0.177 
 (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.029)  (0.024) 
 
Table 2c 
Estimation results for Markov chain: females 
 
 Public  Private  Informal  Not  working 
Initial distribution: 1995     
 0.412  0.069  0.110  0.409 
 (0.017)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.017) 
Final distribution: 1997     
 0.342  0.078  0.485  0.095 
 (0.016)  (0.009)  (0.017)  (0.010) 
Limiting distribution       
 0.323  0.116  0.491  0.070 
 (0.046)  (0.024)  (0.042)  (0.017) 
Probability transition matrix     
 Public  Private  Informal  Not  working 
Public 0.704  0.055  0.210  0.032 
 (0.024)  (0.012)  (0.021)  (0.009) 
Private 0.156  0.310  0.482  0.052 
 (0.047)  (0.061)  (0.065)  (0.028) 
Informal 0.151  0.119  0.643  0.087 
 (0.037)  (0.034)  (0.050)  (0.029) 
Not working  0.061  0.052  0.719  0.168 
 (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.024)  (0.020) 
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Conditional on moving from the public sector it appears that males are more likely to 
move to the private sector than females. The probability of a male moving from the 
public sector in 1995 to the private sector in 1997 is 0.104 while the probability for a 
female for the same move is 0.055. Conditional on moving these probabilities are 0.29 
and 0.185, respectively. The unconditional probability of moving from the public sector 
to the informal sector are identical for males and females, but, given that females are 
less likely to move out of the public sector, this yields a conditional probability of 
moving from the public sector to the informal sector for males and females of 0.564 and 
0.707, respectively. Therefore, conditional on moving out of the public sector, females 
and males are more likely to move to the informal sector than to the private sector. 
However, males are more likely than females to move to the private sector while 
females are more likely to move to the informal sector. 
When looking at individuals who worked in the private sector in 1995 we again see 
different patterns between males and females. Females have a 5 per cent lower 
probability of staying in the private sector compared to males. Of people who do move, 
males are again less likely to move to the informal sector. Males have a conditional 
probability of moving to the informal sector of 0.65 compared to 0.695 for females. The 
conditional probability of a male moving to the public sector is 0.29 compared to 0.22 
for females. Again we see that if an individual moves from their 1995 job, females are 
more likely to move to the informal sector compared to males, although it is always the 
case that most people move to the informal sector rather than to a formal job. Taken 
together, the gender-based mobility patterns confirm our observations from the 
descriptive statistics. 
When comparing the initial distribution to the final and/or limiting distributions we see 
that the increase in the informal sector comes from two main sources: movements out of 
the public sector and movements out of not working. We saw above that for people who 
separated from the public sector, females were more likely to move to the informal 
sector. The same is true for those who moved out of not working. The probability of 
remaining not working is roughly the same for males and females but the probability of 
moving from not working to the informal sector is significantly higher for females than 
for males. Most of the movement out of not working is to the informal sector but it 
seems that males are more likely to find formal employment while females are more 
likely to work in the informal sector.  
5 Regression  results 
In the previous section we looked at the overall properties of the transition in Bulgaria 
from before to after the crisis in 1996. In this section our aim is to further analyze the 
transition and control for individuals observed characteristics. We use a multinomial 
logit model to capture the labour choice of individuals.10 While individuals may not 
have a great deal of choice over their separation from their employment in 1995, they do 
                                                 
10  We could have used a multinomial probit model instead of a multinomial logit model but we found 
that because of small sample size in some of the regressions the logit model was more stable than the 
probit model. In any case, the test of IIA was never rejected so that the use of the logit specification is not 
rejected on IIA grounds.   15
have choices as to where they move. Hence we believe that the logit specification is the 
appropriate specification for looking at the mobility of workers during the transition.  
The marginal effects from our multinomial logit regressions are reported in Tables 3-
6.11 Our dependent variable includes the four choices facing a potential labourer, 
namely public sector employment, private (formal) sector employment, work in the 
(private) informal sector and not working. The labour force state held by a respondent in 
1997 is regressed on a set of 1995 characteristics of that respondent. The multinomial 
logit is performed over four different samples. We start with those who were in the 
public sector in 1995 and ask what are the determinants of where they work in 1997. 
We then proceed to ask the same question of those who were in the formal private 
sector in 1995, the informal private sector in 1995, and those not working in 1995. We 
are able to identify the effect of 1995 demographic and other characteristics on the 
probability a person starting from each of the four original states remains in their origin 
sector or moves into one of the three remaining labour market categories.  
5.1  Public employment as the sector of origin 
The marginal effects from the multinomial logit using public employment in 1995 as the 
origin sector are reported in Table 3. These results confirm our prior of a skill gap 
between public sector employees and individuals who exited public sector employment 
for non-employment. Education has a significant and positive marginal effect on the 
probability of staying in the public sector, while education has a significant and negative 
marginal effect on moving from the public sector to either the informal sector or not 
working. 
The urban variable has a significant and positive effect on the probability of staying in 
the public sector, suggesting that a disproportionate number of lost public jobs occurred 
in the rural area. If an individual leaves public employment then those in the urban areas 
are significantly less likely to move to the not working category. This suggests that it is 
easier to find an informal sector job in urban areas than in rural areas. 
We see that age has a non-linear, inverted U shape, effect on the probability of staying 
in the public sector. Thus it appears that both the young and the old are more likely to 
move from the public sector. The inverse of this relationship is found in the marginal 
effects of age on movements from the public sector into either the informal sector or not 
working. Age does not have any significant marginal effect on the probability of 
moving into the private sector. The only characteristics that had a significant marginal 
effect of moving into the private sector from the public sector were gender and whether 
you had a child under the age of 6. We found that there was a significantly negative 
marginal effect for a female of moving into the private sector from the public sector. 
This accords with our earlier finding that females are less likely to move to private 
sector from the public sector. We also find that individuals who have children have a 
higher marginal probability of working in the private sector. This could be because 
these people are willing to take any job that is offered. We cannot test this hypothesis, 
as we do not know the type of jobs at which these people work. However, we do see 
                                                 
11  The numbers of observations in the regressions differ from the transition matrices above, as we 
have lost cases because of missing observations.   16
that individuals with children under the age of 6 are less likely to move into not 
working, which is consistent with the story above. 
 
Table 3 
Those in public sector employment in 1995; their situation in 1997 
(marginal effects from multinomial logit) 



















































































Pseudo R_square  0.076 
No. of observations  676 
LR chi2   94.68 
 
Note: *, **, *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively. 
5.2  Private employment as the sector of origin 
The marginal effects of the individual characteristics for those individuals who were 
working in the private (formal) sector in 1995 are reported in Table 4. As we saw in 
Section 4 the size of this sector is very small (around 10 per cent) and does not change 
much after the transition (around 11 per cent). We do see some characteristics having 
significant marginal effect on the probability of moving from the private sector to the 
public sector. In particular, married people are more likely to move to the public sector, 
while ethnic minorities, people who live in urban areas, and people with children under 
the age of 6 are less likely to move. Given the small number of individuals in this 
category it is difficult to draw any strong conclusions from these results, though there 
appears movement to the public sector in the rural areas.   17
Table 4 
Those in private sector employment in 1995; their situation in 1997 
(marginal effects from multinomial logit) 



















































































Pseudo R_square  0.169 
No. of observations  140 
LR chi2  55.25 
 
Note: *, **, *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively. 
5.3 Informal  sector  as  the sector of origin 
The marginal effects from the multinomial logit regressions using the (private) informal 
sector as sector of origin are reported in Table 5. We see from these results that being 
married has a significant and positive marginal impact on the probability of moving 
from the informal sector to not working. However, children under the age of 6 have a 
significant and negative marginal impact on the probability of moving from informal 
work to not working.12 Therefore, individuals are more likely to move out of the 
informal sector to not working if they are married but not so if they have children under 
the age of six. Finally, living in an urban region has a significant and negative marginal 
effect on the probability of moving from the informal sector to not working. This again 
suggests that there are more informal job opportunities in urban areas as compared to 
rural areas. 
                                                 
12  As a check we added an interaction between the married dummy and the children dummy but this 
term was insignificant in all regressions and did not change the results. Hence, we do not report the results 
with the interaction term included. We did the same with the interaction of female and having children 
under 6, which was also insignificant in all regressions and did not change the results.   18
Table 5 
Those in informal sector employment in 1995; their situation in 1997 
(marginal effects from multinomial logit) 



















































































Pseudo R_square  0.252 
No. of observations  180 
LR chi2  87.55 
Note: *, **, *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively. 
5.4  Not working as the sector of origin 
The results from the multinomial logit regression using not working as the sector of 
origin are reported in Table 6. As we found in Section 4, there was a lot of movement 
out of not working during this transition. We see that education has a significant and 
negative marginal effect on the probability of staying in not working and a significant 
and positive marginal effect on the probability of moving from not working to either the 
public sector or the private (formal) sector. We also see that individuals who live in an 
urban area also have a lower probability of remaining not working. This along with the 
result that individuals in the urban regions are also more likely to get private jobs (either 
formal or informal) suggests that jobs are easier to come by in the urban areas. We also 
see that females are more likely than males to get an informal sector job and less likely 
to get a public sector job. Thus, controlling for other individual characteristics, there do 
appear to be gender differences in where individuals go when they leave not working.   19
Table 6 
Those not working in 1995; their situation in 1997 
(marginal effects from multinomial logit) 



















































































Pseudo R_square  0.145 
No. of observations  474 
LR chi2  129.18 
 
Note: *, **, *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively. 
6 Conclusion 
As transition to a market based economy proceeds, the private sector grows. The private 
sector we have spoken about above is composed of two very different groups of 
labourers: those who obtain formal private sector jobs and those who obtain informal 
private sector jobs. The cause of the co-existence of the formal and informal sectors 
appears to be the side effects of deliberate government policy. Government policy vis-a-
vis extra taxes, protective labour legislation, support for unions, payoffs, and a variety 
of other measures, ensure, ‘artificially’, that the formal private sector will be a high cost 
sector.  
The informal sector is largely unobserved, and it is of interest to consider its 
relationship to other sectors of the economy. Even our simple presentation, however, 
points out how complicated this relationship is, and how intertwined the informal sector 
is with the rest of the economy. In Bulgaria, the political economy of transition led to 
policy inertia during the first half of the 1990s. A banking crisis struck in December 
1996-January 1997. Rapid privatization of state-owned enterprises followed. Between   20
1995 and 1997, the informal sector grew both absolutely and relative to the private 
sector, while the public sector shrunk in absolute and relative terms.  
Overall, the pattern of the transition is one of movement out of formal employment into 
informal employment. The crisis caused a large reduction in the size of the public 
sector, and displaced workers could not find jobs in the formal private sector. Hence 
they were forced to find work in the informal private sector. Also, the economic crisis 
forced people who were initially out of the labour force to rejoin the labour force, 
mostly the informal sector. In our sample, we did observe some retired individuals who 
left retirement and found a job in the public or formal private sectors between 1995 and 
1997. While most of the movement was into the informal sector for both males and 
females, there were some gender differences. Females were more likely to join the 
informal sector than males but also less likely to leave the public sector.  
When we studied the movement of workers controlling for a number of individual 
characteristics we saw a number of interesting results. First, more education meant 
increased likelihood of obtaining a job in the formal sector (either public or private). We 
also saw that it was more likely for someone to move into the informal sector if they 
lived in an urban area suggesting that the informal sector was mainly an urban 
phenomenon. The regression results also reinforced the aggregate results that females 
were less likely to move to formal private jobs and more likely to move to the informal 
sector. We also saw that individuals who had children under the age of 6 were also more 
likely to have a job, either formal or informal.  
The results reported in Sections 4 and 5 indicate that there was a significant increase in 
the size of the informal sector after the crisis in 1996. The increase in the informal 
sector came from two sources: a downsizing of the public sector and a movement out of 
not working. The crisis in Bulgaria caused a great amount of hardship and many people 
found informal work to get by.  
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